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ABSTRACT 
SED-ESV-2007-0005 
Washington Savannah River Company (WSRC) operates the Savannah River Site (SRS) in 
Aiken, SC under contract with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).  SRS had the need to ship 
227 drums of low enriched uranium oxide (LEUO) to a disposal site.  The LEUO had been 
packaged nearly 25 years ago in U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 17C 55-gallon drums 
and stored in a warehouse.  Since the 235U enrichment was just above 1 percent by weight (wt%) 
the material did not qualify for the fissile material exceptions in 49 CFR 173.453, and therefore 
was categorized as “fissile material” for shipping purposes.  WSRC evaluated all existing Type 
AF packages and did not identify any feasible packaging.  Applying for a new Type AF 
certificate of compliance was considered too costly for a one-time/one-way shipment for 
disposal.  Down-blending the material with depleted uranium (to reduce enrichment below 1 
wt% and enable shipment as low specific activity (LSA) radioactive material) was considered, 
but appropriate blending facilities do not exist at SRS.  After reviewing all options, WSRC 
concluded that seeking a DOT Special Permit was the best option to enable shipment of the 
material for permanent disposal.  WSRC submitted the Special Permit application to the DOT, 
and after one request-for-additional-information (RAI) the permit was considered acceptable.  
However, in an interesting development that resulted from the DOT Special Permit application 
process, it was determined that it was more appropriate for the DOE to issue a Type AF 
certificate [Ref. 1] for this shipping campaign.  This paper will outline the DOT Special Permit 
application and Type AF considerations, and will discuss the issuance of the new DOE Type AF 
certificate of compliance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Savannah River Site’s (SRS) inventory of legacy low-enriched uranium oxide (LEUO) packaged 
in 55-gallon galvanized steel drums (see Figure 1) was destined for permanent disposal.  Since 
the material was enriched in 235U slightly greater than 1 wt% it was classified as fissile material 
with less than A2 Curies per package.  Under the DOT regulations [Ref. 2] this material would 
have to be shipped in accordance with the Type AF fissile material packaging and transportation 
regulations.  Packaging for Type AF material as well as associated documentation was not 
available for this material so SRS chose to seek a Special Permit (SP) from the DOT.  The 
rational for seeking the SP was that the LEUO would have no disposition path and the material 
would remain at SRS indefinitely.  Shipment of the material, without a SP, would require the 
material to be 1) repackaged or 2) down-blended to reduce the enrichment, neither of which were 
considered prudent or viable.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Array of 55 Gallon LEUO drums. 
 
SRS evaluated all known Type AF packages and could not identify any packagings that were 
feasible for this application.  The evaluation of Type AF package designs identified a total of 65 
Type AF container designs, 53 of which were not approved for powder/oxide (approvals were for 
fuel, pellets, overpacks, import/export only, and liquids).  Of the 12 remaining designs, 9 were 
evaluated in detail.  Evaluation of the 9 designs concluded that 4 could no longer be fabricated, 3 
were too small (22 lbs payload, requiring ~7800 packages), and 2 were high cost reusable 
containers that were not amenable for handling/disposal, and would have cost in excess of $2M 
to fabricate.  Additionally, use of any of the 9 container designs would have required extensive 
material handling with associated industrial hygiene and radiation/contamination hazard control.  
Based on this, SRS concluded that there were no viable Type AF packaging options that could be 
readily used.  
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Since alternative packages were not identified, SRS concluded that seeking a DOT Special 
Permit was the best option to achieve the permanent disposal of the material. 
 
DOT SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATION 
 
The requirements for a DOT Special Permit application are given in 49 CFR 107.105 and require 
the following information. 
• Applicants name and address. 
• Description of SP proposal. 
o A citation of the specific regulation from which the applicant seeks relief. 
o Proposed mode of transportation. 
o A detailed description of the proposed special permit, such as alternative 
packaging, or special procedural controls with written descriptions and 
supporting documentation. 
o A statement outlining the applicant’s basis for seeking relief from the specific 
regulations. 
o Identification and description of the hazardous materials planned for 
transportation under the SP. 
o For alternative packaging, documentation of the quality assurance controls, 
package design, manufacture, performance test criteria, in-service performance 
and service-life limitations. 
• Justification of SP proposal. 
o Information describing all relevant shipping and incident experience that relates 
to the application. 
o A statement identifying any increased risk to safety or property that may result if 
the special permit is granted, and a description of the measures to be taken to 
address that risk; and 
o Substantiation, with applicable analyses, data or test results, that the proposed 
alternative will achieve a level of safety that is at least equal to that required by 
the regulation from which the SP is sought. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
 
 
SRS Special Permit Strategy.  Since the SRS LEUO material was classified as fissile, criticality 
evaluations had to be carried out to determine safe mass limits under 10 CFR 71.55 [Ref. 3] 
normal and accident conditions.  The strategy used in the SP application was to 1) determine the 
amount of LEUO material that would remain subcritical (safe) when formed into an optimally 
moderated, fully reflected sphere (worst case for criticality evaluation) and, 2) request exemption 
from the 173.453(d) requirement that limits uranium-235 enrichment to a maximum of 1%; specifically, 
“Uranium enriched in U-235 to a maximum of 1 percent by weight.”  Determination of the worst case 
safe critical mass of LEUO material was then imposed as a conveyance mass limit to ensure 
subcriticality safety.  This strategy simplified the application because the package structure and 
configuration did not have to be defended under accident conditions. Requesting exemption from 
the 1 wt% limit would allow shipment as LSA material with the requirement for an IP-1 
packaging for domestic transport.  As will be noted below, the request for exemption from the 1 
wt% limit was changed to a request for a packaging exemption as a result of one round of 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) questions. 
 
The SRS SP application was completed and submitted to the DOT in accordance with the 
Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1B, “Packaging and Transportation Safety” [Ref. 4] that 
governs SP applications.  This necessitated submittal of the application to the DOE 
Environmental Management (EM) Packaging Certification Program (PCP) Office for review.  
Upon completion of their review, the PCP forwarded the application to the DOT for the 49 CFR 
review, and DOT forwarded the application to the NRC for review of the criticality analysis.   
 
Request for Additional Information Changes SP Strategy.  As a result of the SP review, the 
DOT/NRC issued SRS a request-for-additional-information (RAI) in the form of questions.  SRS 
successfully provided the additional information and NRC recommended approval of the SP 
application.  However, one significant change was made to the application as a result of the 
RAIs; the NRC recommended that SRS request exemption from the packaging requirements for 
fissile materials rather than requesting exemption from the 1 wt% fissile limit.  SRS agreed with 
the NRC recommendation and modified the SP to request exemption from the fissile material 
packaging requirements.   
 
Specifically, “exemption was requested from the fissile materials packaging requirements 
in 173.417(a)(1)(ii); specifically, “Except as provided in 173.453, fissile materials 
containing not more than A1 or A2 as appropriate, must be packaged in one of the 
following packagings:  (ii) Any Type AF, Type B(U)F, or Type B(M)F packaging that 
meets the applicable standards for fissile material packages in 10 CFR part 71.”  The 
exemption is sought from only the packaging requirements.  All other requirements for 
fissile material shipments will be met (e.g. shipping papers, marking, labeling, and 
placarding). 
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The Special Permit modification to request a “packaging exception” strategy rather than a “1 
wt% fissile material exception” strategy resulted in the need to provide additional drum 
packaging details as required by 49 CFR 107.105(c)(9).  Included in this information was the 
fact that the DOT 17C drums met the DOT 7A Type A performance requirements.  Previously the 
application did not include the fact that the drums met DOT 7A criteria because the IP-1 
packaging category was all that was required to ship the material as LSA.  Hence the SP 
application now demonstrated criticality safety under normal and accident conditions and the 
packaging documentation now justified DOT 7A Type A performance.   
 
The DOT and NRC accepted the SRS RAI responses, and technically approved the SP 
application.  As DOT was reviewing the documentation in preparation for issuing the Special 
Permit they recognized that sufficient information had been provided to justify a Type AF 
certificate of compliance.  The packaging met DOT 7A Type A criteria and subcriticality had 
been demonstrated under 10 CFR 71.55 normal and accident conditions. 
TYPE AF CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
 
The DOT recommended to SRS and the DOE EM Packaging Certification Program that 
consideration be given to issuance of a Type AF COC.  The EM PCP reviewed the approval 
documentation from the DOT and NRC and agreed that the requirements for a Type AF COC had 
been met.  Subsequently EM PCP then summarized all of the DOT/NRC approval 
documentation in concert with their Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and certificate 
USA/9976/AF (DOE) was issued on September 16, 2006.   
 
The overall time from submittal of the SP application to the DOT to the issuance of the COC by 
EM PCP was 14 months.  Approximately 4 man-months of engineering effort were required for 
the SRS Special Permit and related Type AF documentation (1-2 man-years).  Since the LEUO 
drums were in storage at SRS, the majority of criticality work had already been completed for 
Facility Safety purposes.  Hence the SP application was able to benefit from existing analysis 
and therefore was a relatively low cost effort.  Shortly after issuance of the certificate, SRS 
successfully completed the shipments and disposition of all of the LEUO drums.  The packaging, 
transportation and disposition effort was successful. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The SRS decision to seek a DOT Special Permit resulted in successful completion of the LEUO 
shipping and disposition campaign.  During the course of obtaining the Special Permit the SRS 
application was modified sufficiently to eventually justify issuance of a Type AF Certificate of 
Compliance rather than a DOT Special Permit.  The overall time from submittal of the initial SP 
application to DOT to the issuance of the COC by the DOE EM Packaging Certification Program 
was 14 months.  The cost of obtaining the approval was relatively low as compared to the effort 
required to develop a new Type AF packaging and associated SARP documentation. 
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